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ABSTRACT
With millions of Americans unable to cope with the rising costs
of prescription drugs, and many even forced to go without health
insurance, the mounting pressure on Congress to enact major
healthcare reform culminated in the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003. This iBrief examines
this legislation, and concludes that it provides elusive benefits for
seniors and merely creates a windfall for the pharmaceutical and
insurance industries.

INTRODUCTION
In 2002, aggregate health spending in the United States reached an
astounding $1.6 trillion.2 As the second richest country in the world,3 it is
even more staggering to find that healthcare spending increased by 9.3%
while the gross domestic product increased by only 3.9%.4 Retail prescription
drug sales, which reached an all-time high of $162.4 billion, accounted for the
largest increase in healthcare spending.5 Moreover, when coupled with
¶1
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chronic care spending, long-term care now represents more than 75% of all
healthcare expenditures.6 Economists predict this figure will only continue to
escalate as the Baby Boomer generation ages.7
While increased expenditures represent a stable economic status and
evidence of our nation’s ability to pay for life-extending healthcare, it is
undeniable that the current healthcare system is inefficient and unsustainable.8
Given the high level of healthcare spending and the rising number of
individuals who are unable to afford proper healthcare, the uneven and unjust
nature of the American healthcare system is patently obvious. More than 40
million Americans are uninsured,9 and more elderly patients every year must
chose between paying for prescription drugs and paying for rent.10
¶2

In December 2003, President Bush signed into the law the most
recent federal healthcare reform—the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).11 This iBrief looks at
the various components of the MMA and addresses the major implications of
this more than 700 page bill. Part I examines the factors that led to healthcare
and prescription drug coverage reform. Next, Part II gives a general overview
of the MMA. Part III contextualizes these provisions and analyzes their
impact on the American healthcare system. Finally, this iBrief argues that
while the MMA is well intentioned, it may actually exacerbate the underlying
problems of the healthcare system and create a windfall for the
pharmaceutical and insurance industries.
¶3

I. THE BRAND NAME PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: THE STRUGGLE
TO MAINTAIN POWER
Brand name prescription retail sales are at an all-time high. In 2002,
the brand name pharmaceutical firm Pfizer recorded revenues totaling $32.4
billion, including over $8 billion in retail sales of their cholesterol-reducing

¶4
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11
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223, 4980G; 42 USCA §§ 299b-7, 1395b-8, 1395b-9, 1395w-3a, 1395w-3b,
1395w-27a, 1395w-29, 1395w-101 to 1395w-104, 1395w-111 to 1395w-116,
1395w-131 to 1395w-134, 1395w-141, 1395w- 151, 1395w-152, 1395cc-3,
1395kk-1, 1395zz, 1395hhh, 1396u-5) [hereinafter MMA].
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drug Lipitor.12 In the same year, companies such as Merck and AstraZeneca
grossed retail sales of over $5.6 billion and $4.6 billion for their high-demand
drugs Zocor and Prilosec, respectively.13 For the fifth straight year,
pharmaceutical firms ranked as the most profitable industry in the nation.14
Pfizer led U.S. pharmaceutical companies with $7.8 billion in profits
in 2001, which is more than the profits of all the Fortune 500
companies in the homebuilding, apparel, railroad, and publishing
industries combined. Merck was the second most profitable
pharmaceutical netting $7.3 billion, which is more than the profits of
all the Fortune 500 companies in the semi-conductor, pipeline, food
production, mining and crude oil production, and hotel, casino and
resort industries combined.15

With such an enormous financial interest in maintaining high
prescription drug prices and market exclusivity, pharmaceutical companies
have spent millions of dollars to extend patent protection and forestall
government regulation of prescription drug prices. From 1999 to 2003, the
pharmaceutical industry made campaign contributions of more than $50
million in an effort to keep drug prices unregulated16 and from 1996 to 2003
spent $435 million to influence Congress via the efforts of more than 600
lobbyists.17
¶5

The increase in both health expenditures and pharmaceutical industry
profits has not gone unnoticed. Physicians, consumers, and state governments
alike are buying drugs from Canada and Mexico, despite possible legal
ramifications, because the difference in the cost of drugs in those countries is
drastically lower than in the United States. 18 State and city governments in

¶6
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Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, New York, and
Massachusetts have all begun investigating or implementing programs to
import cheaper prescription drugs from Canada.19
As consumer pressure mounts and evidence suggests that the Food
and Drug Administration’s (FDA) crack-down on the illegal importation of
prescription drugs has little to do with actual safety concerns and more to do
with the pharmaceutical industry’s vast political influence over the FDA,20
various entities have filed lawsuits seeking the right to import prescription
drugs.21 Most recently, Governor Jim Douglas announced that Vermont
expects to be the first state to sue the FDA for their recent “unsubstantiated”
denial of a pilot program aimed at lowering prescription drug expenditures for
current and retired state employees by nearly $1 million via a state contract
with a Canadian mail-order pharmaceutical company.22
¶7

Such attempts to find less expensive means of obtaining prescription
drugs are the offshoot of a recent shift in the consumer market toward
generics. Brand name pharmaceutical companies have been experiencing
declining profits as people opt for generic bioequivalents of brand name
prescription drugs that cost, on average, 30-60% less than their brand name
counterparts.23 For example, since the expiration of Claritin’s patent
protection in December 2002, Schering-Plough’s retail sales for the drug
¶8
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Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers’ New Intensity in Defense of U.S. Borders, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at C1 [hereinafter Defense of U.S. Borders]; Gardiner
Harris, Cheap Drugs From Canada: Another Political Hot Potato, N.Y. TIMES,
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Id.
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Gail Russell Chaddock, Profits, Politics, and a Drug patent, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, July 19, 2000, available at
http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/07/19/text/p1s2.html (last visited Mar.
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declined more than $1.8 billion in the first half of 2003 and led to a staggering
20% decline in Schering-Plough’s stock price.24
In an attempt to maintain control over the American drug market,
pharmaceutical companies have countered reimportation efforts by reducing
their overall drug sales to Canadian retailers.25 Pointedly, Pfizer has ordered
its Canadian wholesale distributors to provide lists of sales of its products to
individual drugstores, warning that Pfizer will halt all drug supplies if drugs
are being sold to American sources.26

¶9

A. Congress’ Initial Attempt to Balance Power in the Industry
Congress spent six years debating and amending a bill, referred to as
the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,27 aimed at balancing the interests of
consumers in receiving safe and affordable medications with those of both the
brand name and generic pharmaceutical companies in protecting patent rights
and maintaining profitability.28 Specifically, the Act established three key
measures: (1) patent term restoration for brand name patents,29 (2) the ability
for generic firms to file an “abbreviated new drug application” (ANDA) for
any new generic drug,30 and (3) a 180-day period of exclusivity for sales and
¶10
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Barlett, supra note 12, at 49.
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Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§
301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(1994)).
28
See H.R. Rep. 98-857(I), at ¶ 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647-48 (affirming that the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted “to make available
more low cost generic drugs . . . [and] to create a new incentive for increased
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are subject to
pre-market approval”).
29
To appease brand name firms, patent term extensions were made available for
losses in patent terms cause by FDA regulatory delays, but only if drug firms
employed due diligence in achieving any such patent term restoration. 35 U.S.C. §
156 (2000). Patent term restorations may be obtained that are equal to one-half of
the time it takes to run human clinical trials on a new drug plus the period of FDA
review. However, the maximum extension is five years and the total length of
exclusivity cannot exceed 14 years. Id.
30
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (2000). As an incentive to expedite the production and
approval of generic drugs, the Act also permitted generic firms to submit an
ANDA, whereby FDA safety and efficacy testing was no longer mandatory with a
demonstration of bioequivalence to a brand name drug. Id. However, the Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act did require ANDA applicants to certify that the patent on
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marketing given to the first generic firm to file an ANDA with the FDA.31
Brand name pharmaceutical companies were also given an additional
protection against potential abuses by generic firms.
Accordingly, an
automatic 30 month stay on FDA approval of any generic ANDA was granted
if a brand name firm initiated a legal challenge asserting patent
infringement.32
Despite the fact that these new provisions increased the availability
and use of generic prescription drugs, the Hatch-Waxman Act ultimately
failed to achieve its goals or adequately address the problems that Congress
originally sought to remedy. In fact, the Hatch-Waxman Act exacerbated the
power struggle between brand name pharmaceutical companies, generic firms,
and the public. The Act was susceptible to further monopolistic abuses such
as antitrust violations, further delays in the release of generic drugs, and
significant increases in prescription drug prices.33 A Federal Trade

¶11

the drug or method of use: (I) had not been filed in a previous patent application;
(II) had expired; (III) would expire on a particular date; OR (IV) was
invalid/would not be infringed by the drug for which the ANDA was being sought.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). In the case of a “paragraph IV certification,” the brand name
drug company would be given notice, § 355(j)(2)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c)(6)
(2003), and a 45-day period within which they could bring an action for patent
infringement against the ANDA applicant. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Such an action
automatically triggered a mandatory 30-month stay on the approval of the ANDA.
Id.
31
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2). The Act also provided a financial incentive for generic
drug companies to challenge allegedly invalid patents or market drugs that they
believe do not infringe on current brand name patents. The first generic firm to
file an ANDA with the FDA would be granted a 180-day period of exclusivity
during which no other generic manufacturer may obtain FDA approval or market
its version of the drug. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
32
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
33
See Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of
Patent Settlements Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
107th Cong. (2001) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm; see also NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDITURES IN 2001: ANOTHER YEAR OF
ESCALATING COSTS (Mar. 29, 2002), available at http://www.nihcm.org; FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY (July 2002) [hereinafter FTC STUDY], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (last revised Sept. 10, 2002).
After instituting several complaints against some of the leading brand name and
generic pharmaceutical companies for alleged antitrust actions including,
agreements made by drug companies to (1) intentionally delay generic drug
competition in exchange for millions of dollars, (2) tie up key ingredients used in
the making of prescription drugs so that demand was increased, and (3) impose
unwarranted price increases, the FTC finally proposed an industry-wide study to
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Commission (FTC) study conducted in 2002 demonstrated that generic drug
entry into the marketplace has been delayed even further by cunning
manipulations of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 34 For example, the 30-month stay
provision, which was designed to protect brand name firms from the improper
appropriation of patented drugs, has been abused in several instances to delay
the entry of generic drugs into the marketplace for up to 12 years in some
cases.35
The same FTC study also found that the regulations governing the
180-day period of exclusivity granted to generic firms for filing the first
ANDA were problematic.36 Although the 180-day marketing exclusivity
provision was intended to facilitate and encourage generic firms to bring their
drugs to market sooner, it actually delayed the entry of such generics into the
marketplace.37 The 180-day exclusivity period only begins to run from the
first date of commercial marketing of the generic, or from the date of a court
decision declaring the brand name patent invalid or not infringed. As such, the
FTC study found multiple instances where generic firms suspended the start
of the 180-day exclusivity period (1) as part of a settlement agreement in
patent infringement suits brought by brand name firms, or (2) until a court
decision had been rendered in their favor.38 Therefore, all generic competition
in the marketplace is suspended indefinitely when the first firm to file an
ANDA fails to trigger the start of their exclusive rights.39
¶12

examine the impediments to a more competitive and less costly drug market. Id.;
see also, Federal Trade Commission Decision and Order, In the Matter of Abbott
Laboratories, (Mar. 16, 2000) (No. 981 0395) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03; Federal Trade Commission Administrative
Complaint, In the Matter of Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P.,
and Andrx Corporation, (Mar. 16, 2000) (No. 9293), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03; Federal Trade Commission In the Matter of
Schering-Plough Corporation, et al., (Mar. 30, 2001) (No. 9297).
34
FTC STUDY, supra note 33.
35
Debra Z. Anderson, The Private Sector: Delaying Cheap Pills, POST-GAZETTE,
July 19, 2003, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/03119/180170.stm.
36
FTC STUDY, supra note 33.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. The FDA has recently enacted new regulations that attempt to address these
concerns. 21 C.F.R. § 314, et. seq. The new regulations which became
enforceable on December 18, 2003, limit brand name firms to a single automatic
30-month stay to resolve any allegations of false “paragraph IV certifications” and
curtail the late filing of frivolous patents in an effort to delay generic drug entry
into the marketplace. §§ 314.52, 314.95, 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A). Instead, the FDA
will now require pharmaceutical firms to submit detailed patent information
regarding the active ingredients, the drug composition, the approved uses of the
drug, and a signed affidavit that certifies the validity of such information. §§
314.94-.95, 314.101. False submissions to the FDA will also result in strict
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Due to the problems created by the Hatch-Waxman Act and
continued negative press about the high costs of prescription drugs, the MMA
was touted as problem-solving reform and was strong-armed into law. Yet,
even before the ink from Bush’s signature could dry, the bill was already
being criticized for its elusive benefits.40

¶13

II. CONGRESS’ SECOND ATTEMPT AT REFORM: THE MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT & MODERNIZATION
ACT OF 2003
A. Provisions for Seniors
The MMA has been touted as a solution for elderly people with low
incomes and very high drug bills. For the first time since the inception of the
Medicare program in 1965, seniors will be given the opportunity to have
prescription drug coverage under a new voluntary “Medicare Part D” benefit
plan. Coverage is scheduled to take effect in two stages. Beginning in June
2004, Medicare participants were able to buy discount drug cards for use at
retail pharmacies.41 The second phase of the MMA, scheduled to begin in
2006, will permit Medicare beneficiaries to sign up for a stand-alone drug
plan or join a private health plan with drug coverage.42

¶14

1. Discount Drug Cards—§ 101
¶15
Under Title I, § 101 of the MMA, the Department of Health &
Human Services must establish a temporary prescription drug discount plan.43
Under the plan, Medicare participants who are not already given drug benefits
under Medicaid are eligible to purchase discount drug cards for $30 a year.44
In addition, the Act requires the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) to ensure that each geographic area offers at least two alternative
criminal penalties. §§ 314.80, 314.81, 314.170, 314.630. Although the new FDA
regulations address two of the primary abuses of the Hatch-Waxman Act, they
ultimately fail to remedy the loopholes in the 180-day exclusivity period.
40
See Robert Pear, Medicare Law’s Costs and Benefits Are Elusive, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Costs and Benefits Are Elusive].
41
Robert Pear, Coalition Promoting Drug Discount Cards, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2004, at Al.
42
The Skinny On The Medicare Bill, CBSNEWS.COM, Nov. 25, 2003 [hereinafter
The Skinny], at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/25/politics/main585469.shtml (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004).
43
MMA § 101 (1860D-31) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-141).
44
Id.; ARENT FOX, HEALTHCARE ALERT: MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 1 (2003); Alan M. Schlein,
Medicare Reform Bill—Loved, Hated, Hailed and Decried. What’s in it for you?,
FIFTY PLUS, Jan. 2004, at 6, 7.
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choices and publicizes the coverage—i.e. prices, fees, & formularies—for
these discount card programs.45
Card sponsors also will have to (1) ensure acceptance of their cards at
a sufficiently large network of retail pharmacies located throughout
their service area (i.e., access may not be provided solely through
mail-order pharmacies); (2) require that pharmacists at participating
outlets routinely explain price differences between brand and generic
products; and (3) disclose to CMS “the extent to which negotiated
price concessions... by a manufacturer are passed through to enrollees
through pharmacies or otherwise.”46

Discount cards entitle holders to privately negotiated discounts ranging from
10-25% on those prescription drugs listed under the chosen card plan.47
2. New Drug Benefit—§ 101
¶16
In January 2006, discount drug cards will give way to the second
phase of the MMA, which aims to provide two more comprehensive options
to reduce the cost of prescription drugs for seniors.48 Eligible seniors can
enroll in either a “qualified” Prescription Drug Plan or a Medicare Advantage
plan.49
Under these qualified plans, beneficiaries will pay a $35 per month
premium in exchange for either “standard prescription drug coverage” or an
out-of-pocket plan with deductibles, both of which are equivalent in
coverage.50 Standard prescription drug coverage has a $250 annual deductible
and covers 75% of all costs associated with those drugs listed under the plan
up to $2,250 (or a total annual benefit of $1,500).51 However, where drug
costs exceed $2,250, there is no additional benefit until out-of-pocket
expenses reach $3,600.52 If prescription drug costs reach $5,100, said plans

¶17

45

MMA § 101 (1860D-3(a)(1)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w103(a)(1)).
46
ARENT FOX, supra note 44, at 2.
47
Barlett, supra note 12, at 46; ARENT FOX, supra note 44, at 2 (“To facilitate
discounting, the legislation expressly exempts price concessions that
manufacturers extend to Medicare-endorsed card sponsors from Best Price
determinations under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute.”).
48
MMA §§ 101 (1860D-1—4) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w101—4).
49
Id. at § 101 (1860D-1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101).
50
The Skinny, supra note 42.
51
Id. at §§ 101 (1860D-2(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395w-102(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A)).
52
Id. at § 101 (1860D-2(b)(4)(B)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w102(b)(4)(B)).
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will cover 95% of any additional costs.53 Supplementary aid is also available
for catastrophic expenses or when participants’ yearly income and assets fall
below a certain level.54

B. Provisions that Benefit all Americans
1. Individual importation of drugs from Canada—§ 1121
¶18
While the MMA does not permit the importation of prescription
drugs from Canada by pharmacies and wholesalers, it does provide for the
development of regulations that would allow for such importation on a limited
basis by individuals.55 Those with a valid prescription would be entitled to a
90-day supply of a pre-approved drug, in proper dosage form, from a
registered Canadian seller.56 Moreover, the Secretary of DHHS would be
permitted to enact any other restrictions on drug importation that he or she
deemed “necessary to ensure public safety.”57
2. Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)—§ 1201
¶19
Title XII of the MMA provides for the establishment of Health
Savings Accounts (HSA) for those individuals who have high deductible
insurance plans.58 HSAs differ from the pre-existing Archer Medical Savings
Accounts (MSAs) provided for in 26 U.S.C. § 220 in that they are not limited
to individuals who are self-employed or work for a small employer.59 In
addition, HSAs permit individuals or families to establish a tax free fund for
the entire amount of their health insurance deductible over $1,000 (or $2,000
for families) and up to $2,250 (or $4,500 for families), unlike MSAs which

53

The Skinny, supra note 42.
The Skinny, supra note 42.
55
Id. at § 1121(j)(2) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(2)). Despite the
fact that § 1121(b) appears to usher in the importation of drugs from Canada by
retailers and wholesaler, such a program is not likely because of the language of
the MMA. MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, HEALTH LAW UPDATE: CONGRESS
APPROVES MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, 34
(2003) (“Prior similar authority granted to the secretary was never effectuated
because neither the former secretary, nor the current one would conclude that
importation posed ‘no additional risk to the public’s health and safety’ and/or that
it would ‘result in a significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the
American consumer.’ The [MMA] contains a nearly identical certification
requirement, therefore making it unlikely that it will be lawful to import drugs
from Canada any time soon.”)
56
Id. at § 1121(j)(3) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 384(j)(3)).
57
Id.
58
Id. § 1201 (223-24) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 223-24).
59
See 26 U.S.C. § 220(c)(1)(A) (2000).
54
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only permit a tax deduction of 75%.60 Individuals 55 years or older are also
permitted to increase their tax deductible contribution to HSAs by $500 in
2004, $600 in 2005, and by annual $100 increases not exceeding $1,000 by
2009.61
¶20
Additionally, Congress has ensured that eligible individuals will not
be able to double-count such health-related tax deductions by coordinating
benefits of HSAs with those from previously existing MSAs; individuals who
make contributions to HSAs must annually deduct the aggregate amount paid
to MSAs for the same taxable year.62

C. Provisions for The Insurance Industry: The Move Toward Private
Plan Coverage
Prior to the MMA, Medicare beneficiaries were permitted to enroll
in a managed care plan under Part C, or “Medicare + Choice plans,” and
receive the benefits of both Part A and Part B services.63 While Medicare +
Choice plans are already provided by private insurance companies under
government contract, the MMA increases the role of private insurance by
attracting more private companies via the creation of a more competitive fee
structure for reimbursement under Medicare Advantage plans (MA).64 In
addition, the MMA permits the establishment of regional plans that will
permit smaller insurance companies to provide MA coverage and will likely
encourage better discounts for plan participants via increased competition.65
¶21

D. Provisions that Benefit the Drug Industry
1. Brand Name Drug Companies—§§ 101, 1102, 1121
¶22
Brand name prescription drug companies will receive several
benefits under the MMA. First, all of the prescription discounts that the
60

MMA §§ 1201 (223(b)(2)(A)-(B)) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§
223(b)(2)(A)-(B)) (eligible individuals or families may only deduct the lesser of
their annual health insurance deductible or $2,250 or $4,500, respectively).
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Id. at §1201 (223(b)(3)(B)) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§
223(b)(3)(B)).
62
Id. at § 1201 (223(b)(4)(A) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§
223(b)(4)(A)).
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See MEDICARE, MEDICARE PLAN CHOICES OVERVIEW, at
http://www.medicare.gov/Choices/Overview.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
64
ARENT FOX, supra note 44, at 8. The fee structure created by the MMA will
initially compensate participating private insurance companies by the same amount
currently awarded under Medicare’s fee-for-service plans, but will incrementally
increase by either 2% annually or by the additional per capita growth of the new
plan. Id.
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elderly will receive under the bill will remain privately regulated.66 Second,
in an effort to forestall abuses of patent monopolies by generic companies, the
bill eliminates the 180-day exclusivity period that competing bioequivalent
generic drugs were awarded under the Hatch-Waxman Act.67 Third, the MMA
provides for a study on the safety and cost-effectiveness of importing drugs
from Canada, including a provision that might enable the enactment of such
regulations—it does not, however, make such importation legal for
pharmacists or wholesalers.68 As such, brand name drug companies still
remain largely in control of prescription drug prices for American consumers.
2. Generic Drug Companies—§§ 1101, 1103
¶23
Last year the FDA enacted new regulations that addressed abuses to
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 69 The new regulations, which went into effect on
December 18, 2003, limit brand name firms who challenge abbreviated new
drug applications (ANDAs) for patenting generic drugs to a single, automatic
30-month stay to resolve any allegations of false “paragraph IV
certifications.”70 The new regulations also curtail the late filing of frivolous
66

The Skinny, supra note 42.
MMA § 1102(a)(2)(D) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)). Although the
forfeiture of the 180-day exclusivity provision does not appear to benefit brand
name prescription drug companies on its face, it has the effect of permitting them
to keep their monopoly on the market for a longer period of time. In addition,
forfeiture of the exclusivity period may even be provoked by brand name
companies who cause generic companies to violate these provisions. For example,
the exclusivity period may be forfeited by generic companies for a failure to
market or entering into an agreement with another applicant/patent owner to
forestall bringing their drug to market. Id. Yet, the penalty specified for brand
name drug companies who induce generic companies to act in such a manner may
not be much more than a drop in the bucket compared to continued monopolies on
sales of blockbuster drugs. See MMA § 1115 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 note)
(citing civil penalties of not more than $11,000 each day that a brand name drug
company fails to file any such agreements with the FTC. Thus, a brand name drug
company such as Pfizer could potentially induce a generic firm to contract with
them to delay the release of a bioequivalent drug to Lipitor for an entire year and
later only be fined a mere $4,015,000 ($11,000 x 365 days) as compared to the
additional retail sales of over $8 billion; making their net profit worth such
infringements.).
68
MMA § 1121 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355 note, 381 note, 384
note, 535); The Skinny, supra note 42. There is also criticism of the provision of
the MMA that allows for a study on the effects of importing drugs on a larger scale
from Canada because of the manner in which such studies will be carried out. See
Robert Pear, U.S. to Study Importing Canada Drugs but Choice of Leader Prompts
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at A16. However, this section did make it
legal for individuals to import prescription drugs on a limited basis. Id.
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21 C.F.R. § 314; See supra text accompanying note 39.
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§§ 314.52, 314.95, 314.107(b)(3)(i)(A).
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patents by brand name drug companies trying to delay generic drug entry into
the marketplace.71
Although the new FDA regulations addressed two of the main
problems that generic drug companies experienced under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, Title XI of the MMA (“Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals”)
expressly amends the 1984 provisions in a similar fashion.72 Moreover, the
bill adds a new provision that makes bioequivalence of generic drugs easier to
prove.73

¶24

III. ANALYSIS OF MMA: BIG BENEFITS FOR BIG PHARMA & THE
PRIVATE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AT THE EXPENSE OF REAL BENEFITS
FOR SENIORS
With so many provisions in the MMA, it would seem that there is
something for everyone. However, the bill is receiving much more criticism
than praise, especially from those who initially spearheaded the efforts to
reform Medicare. Many Congressional representatives who strongly favored a
Medicare reform bill voted against the MMA, arguing that it was a false
reform designed to make Republicans look good.74

¶25

A. The MMA: A Product of Bad Law-Making?
Signs of what may be termed “irresponsible politics” abound in the
passage of the MMA. As late as November 18, 2003, less than a month
before President Bush signed the bill into law, much of the text of the MMA
was still unavailable to most legislators.75 For such a complicated and lengthy
bill with far reaching implications, it is highly problematic that legislators
may have been signing off on many provisions that they either did not know
were included or whose potential effects they did not have the opportunity to
understand.

¶26

Many of the bill’s supporters openly acknowledged its many
imperfections prior to approval but failed to push for changes, either because

¶27

71

§§ 314.80, 314.81, 314.94-.95, 314.101, 314.170, 314.630.
MMA § 1102 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).
73
MMA § 1103 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)).
74
See Schlein, supra note 44, at 6 (“‘Who do you trust,’ [Senator Edward]
Kennedy argued. ‘The HMO—coddling, drug-company-loving, Medicaredestroying, Social Security-hating Bush administration? Or do you trust
Democrats, who created Medicare and will fight with you to defend it every day of
every week of every year?’”).
75
Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Medicare Plan Covering Drugs Backed by AARP,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2003, at A1.
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they wanted to be able to say that they had passed a discount drug bill or out
of fear of defying those who had contributed millions to their campaigns.76
¶28
In addition, accusations exist that the Bush administration concealed
the actual costs of the bill—between $500 and $600 billion—prior to
Congress’ vote on the matter.77 Some representatives have claimed that cost
estimates of the MMA were repeatedly and expressly withheld by the Bush
administration.78 These claims were recently confirmed by the Department of
Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) internal investigation.79 The report on
the investigation, issued July 6, 2004, found that the top Medicare
administrator, Thomas A. Scully, threatened to fire the program’s chief
actuary, Richard S. Foster, if he were to tell Congress that the drug benefits in
the MMA would likely cost much more than the White House had originally
estimated.80

Amplifying the feeling that political wrangling will leave Americans
to pay the high costs of the MMA is the fact that the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) has been able to create a similar prescription drug discount plan
on a large scale that, according to a National Academy of Sciences study, has
“meaningfully reduced drug expenditures without a demonstrable adverse
[effect] on quality” and without a large effect on the federal budget.81 Not
only was the VA plan ignored as a model for the new Medicare benefit plan,
but other plausible money saving alternatives were also ignored, including
vouchers for the purchase of health insurance and proposals to only aid low
income individuals.82

¶29
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Id. (Consider the following comments: “This is not a perfect bill, but America
cannot wait for perfect”; “‘Getting a large benefit for lots of people that didn’t
exist before is very alluring,’ said Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New
York. Yet Mr. Schumer said he had grave concerns about other parts of the bill
that he called ‘a total sellout to the pharmaceutical industry.’”).
77
Robert Pear & Edmund L. Andrews, White House Says Congressional Estimate
of New Medicare Costs Was Too Low, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A14
[hereinafter Congressional Estimate Too Low]; Robert Pear, Inquiry Confirms Top
Medicare Official Threatened Actuary Over Cost of Drug Benefits, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Official Threatened Actuary].
78
Congressional Estimate Too Low, supra note 77, at A14; Official Threatened
Actuary, supra note 77, at A1.
79
Official Threatened Actuary, supra note 77, at A1.
80
Id. In February 2004, Representative Nick Smith of Michigan was accused of
voting for the MMA in exchange for support for his son’s congressional campaign.
Carl Hulse, Inquiry Sought in House Vote on Drug Plan for Medicare, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A13.
81
Robert Pear & Walt Bogdanich, Some Successful Models Ignored as Congress
Works on Drug Bill, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 4, 2003, at A1.
82
Id.
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B. The MMA Provides Elusive Benefits for Seniors
The provisions aimed at lowering prescription drug costs for seniors
are inherently uncertain. Although President Bush has promised discounts of
up to 25%,83 the text of the MMA makes such discounts anything but certain.
For example, the Act expressly prohibits government “interference” in the
negotiations of such discounts.84 Although the rationale expressly stated in
this provision, “to promote competition,” seems logical, it effectuates a
privately controlled and unallied system. Medicare is left without any
leverage as a government entity because private entities are able to negotiate
discounts and establish drug formularies based solely on what the drug
companies deem proper. Moreover, there are no standards for determining
either the actual discounts or the lists of drugs that will be covered by the
discount plans.
¶30

In addition, MMA provisions that appear to create basic rules
regarding the structure of discount drug plans may backfire and make
discounts even more elusive and more difficult for providers to attain. For
example, plan providers are required to make at least two comparable drugs
for every treatment category available to beneficiaries.85 However, this may
not have the effect of creating options for plan users because plan providers
will likely be forced to create set formularies to ensure compliance with this
provision and to be able to negotiate any substantial discounts. Discounts
may be decreased even further because some smaller insurance companies—
such as those who agree to participate as regional providers—may be forced
into a position marked by a lack in bargaining power. Pointedly, drug
companies will be able to gain a higher price for those drugs they know are
required for plans to comply with MMA provisions.

¶31

An inability to bargain for significant drug discounts could also lead
to an increase in the $35 per month premium for plan participants and
ultimately to participant drop out. The ripple effect extends even farther when
one notes that the discount drug plans provided for in the MMA are exactly
what they are called—voluntary—86 and only a very small fraction of all
seniors have chosen to enroll.87 The voluntary nature of these plans makes
enrollment and the promise of negotiated discounts even more elusive when
one recognizes that not only is there a great deal of confusion surrounding the
¶32
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Schlein, supra note 44, at 6.
MMA § 101 (1860D-11(i)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(j)).
85
MMA § 101 (1860D-4) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w104(b)(3)(C)(i)).
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Id. § 101 (1860D-1) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101).
87
Sign-Ups Lag, supra note 10, at A1 (“[I]t appears that fewer than one million
people in the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program have signed up for
cards.”).
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MMA and what senior’s choices actually are,88 but a large number of
Medicare beneficiaries may be unable to make informed healthcare choices
due to Alzheimer’s disease and other incapacitating ailments.89 Adding to the
current healthcare coverage crisis, the MMA is predicted to lead employers to
reduce or eliminate their employer-sponsored prescription drug coverage for
an estimated 1/3 of all retirees as soon as Medicare begins to offer coverage in
2006.90
Another concrete example of the deceptive nature of drug discount
benefits stems from the very real, very large gaps in coverage. As discussed
supra, drug costs that exceed $2,250 are shifted to participants as out-ofpocket expenses until they reach the catastrophic level and such individuals
have paid over $3,600.91 However, these discount drug plans do not provide
coverage for any drugs excluded from their plans (i.e. those that they are not
able to negotiate discounts for) and out-of-pocket expenses paid to obtain
such drugs are also not applied to the $3,600 limit required for additional
coverage.92

¶33

Furthermore, as per capita drug expenditures under Medicare
increase over time, the costs associated with plan premiums, deductibles, as
well as out-of-pocket expenses will also increase.93 “By 2013, for example,
the out-of-pocket spending required before a person qualifies for catastrophic
coverage will probably be $6,400, well above the $3,600 required in the first
year.”94
¶34
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See Older patients unaware of new Medicare law, CNN.COM, Feb. 26, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/02/26/medicare.survey.ap/index.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2004); Confusion surrounds new Medicare law, CNN.COM, Dec.
22, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/HEALTH/12/22/medicare.confusion.ap/index.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2004).
89
Costs and Benefits Are Elusive, supra note 40, at A1; Schlein, supra note 44, at
6. Others cite a lack of Internet access as another reason why it may be difficult
for the elderly to choose the appropriate drug card program. Sign-Ups Lag, supra
note 10, at A1 (“Lucy E. Utt, director of the health insurance assistance program at
the Tennessee Commission on Aging and Disability, said it was ‘almost
impossible to make a card selection,’ without access to the Internet, either directly
or through a friend, a relative or counselor.”).
90
Robert Pear, Drug Law is Seen Leading to Cuts in Retiree Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Cuts in Retiree Plans].
91
MMA § 101 (1860D-2(b)(1)), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w102(b)(1)).
92
See Robert Pear, New Medicare Plan for Drug Benefits Prohibits Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at 1.
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Patches for the Drug Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 4, at 14
[hereinafter Patches for the Drug Program.].
94
Id.
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These large gaps in coverage might not place as large of a financial
burden on participants if the MMA did not have an additional restriction on
supplemental insurance coverage.95 Under the bill, plan participants will not
be permitted to extend or purchase new Medigap (or similar private
supplemental) insurance, count payments by former employment health plans
toward the $3,600 limit on out-of-pocket expenses, or supplement any drug
coverage from these Medicare plans with Medicaid drug coverage.96

¶35

C. The MMA Provides Big Benefits to the Pharmaceutical and
Insurance Industries
The most criticized aspect of the MMA is that it provides the greatest
benefits to two already thriving industries: the drug and insurance industries.
The unparalleled financial focus that the drug industry has placed on political
lobbying, supra, has led to essentially “tailor-made” provisions that may be
worth the huge sums paid.97

¶36

Three provisions of the MMA exclusively benefit the drug and
insurance industries: (1) privately administered benefit plans, (2) express
prohibition of government participation in the negotiation of discounts, and
(3) an increase in HMO reimbursements. Because the MMA’s new discount
drug plan will be privately administered, the insurance industry will benefit
directly from an estimated $46 billion that will be “pumped” into managed
care by the government over the next ten years.98 Moreover, greater
government reimbursement—upwards of 25%—and increases in the number
of enrollees in participating insurance plans will lead to greater overall
revenues.99 In fact, investors seem to already be placing their bets that HMOs
will experience a 2-5% increase in after-tax profits: shares of Humana have
jumped from $8.81 to $21.53 in just 2 years—an increase of nearly 41%.100
What is more troubling is that as buying power and profits increase, so too
will the insurance industry’s political bargaining power with the government,
making future cut backs or changes to the law difficult and unlikely.
¶37
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Id.
Id.
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Stolberg & Harris, supra note 16, at A1.
98
See Milt Freudenheim, Using Medicare Billions, H.M.O’s Again Court Elderly,
N.Y. TIMES.COM, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/09/business/09CARE.html?ex=1079873862&ei
=1&en=f7fcbb44df723040 (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
99
Id.; Schlein, supra note 44, at 6 (“Fewer than five million of the 40 million
Medicare beneficiaries, about 12 percent, are in private plans. The administration
predicts that the proportion will grow to 35 by 2007, as beneficiaries enroll in
HMOs and PPOs.”).
100
Freudenheim, supra note 98, at A1.
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As discussed supra, barring the government, and more specifically
Medicare, from using its power to leverage lower discount prices against the
drug industry will effectively keep prices higher and may make discounts
much lower than anticipated.101 The precise monetary benefit to the drug
industries, while unknown, is troubling in light of the extremely high price tag
already placed on the MMA and has caused many to wonder if we aren’t
paying twice for this bill—once as taxpayers and then again as consumers.
¶38

D. The MMA May Be Fiscally Imprudent
In addition to providing elusive benefits to seniors and helping to
keep big industry profits high, the MMA has been described as a “fiscal train
wreck.”102 Initially, financial estimates for the bill topped $395 billion over
the next ten years.103 However, less than a month after President Bush signed
the MMA into law, estimates suddenly rose to $540 billion.104 Moreover, this
high estimate may escalate further if the level of drug discounts attained is
lower than predicted. With the federal deficit increasing to over $520 billion,
its highest dollar level ever, tacking on at least another $145 billion to the
price tag of this legislation105 has some legislators outraged and many
Americans worried.
¶39

Despite the fact that President Bush has promised to cut the federal
deficit to $365 billion over the next five years, these estimates do not include
the costs of the war in Iraq—more than $87 billion thus far—or the $162
billion that it will cost to restructure the alternative minimum tax.106
Moreover, it seems a bit underhanded that amidst all of his proclaimed efforts
to provided affordable healthcare to those who need it, President Bush is
planning on cutting back on federal Medicaid funding. Vowing to restore the
“fiscal integrity” to Medicaid, President Bush says that he will save
Americans over $1.5 billion next year and $23.6 billion over the next ten by
¶40
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See section II, A supra.
The Medicare Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at A1.
103
White House raising estimated cost of Medicare overhaul, CNN.COM, Jan. 29,
2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.budget.ap/index.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2004) [hereinafter White House raising estimated cost of Medicare
overhaul].
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Congressional Estimate Too Low, supra note 77, at A14; White House raising
estimated cost of Medicare overhaul, supra note 103 (“Major priorities Bush
proposed last year included: . . . $87 billion this year for wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, $500 million less than he got.”). For more information on what the
Alternative Minimum Tax is see Kaye A. Thomas, Alternative Minimum Tax 101,
FAIRMARK PRESS, INC. (2004), at http://www.fairmark.com/amt/amt101.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2004).
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requiring stricter recording of state spending.107 It seems that this is a zero
sum game—spending billions on Medicare just to cut back on Medicaid is
like starving one hand to feed the other.

CONCLUSION
The costs of the MMA will likely far outweigh its advantages. The
majority of the MMA funds will be spent on satiating the drug industry’s
desire to keep costs privately regulated and fattening the insurance industry’s
bankroll by further privatizing Medicare—both at a higher cost to taxpayers
and to the detriment of the average American, who will see only modest
benefits in the form of larger tax breaks from HSAs and the possibility of
being able to import drugs from Canada.108 Moreover, the estimated $540
billion price tag on the MMA will have far-reaching economic effects that
will likely force legislators to make fundamental changes to the tax system in
the future and may ultimately cause the healthcare system in the United States
to falter.109

¶41
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Robert Pear, U.S. Nears Clash With Governors on Medicaid Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2004, at A1. While it may be true that states have begun to
disproportionately utilize federal funds for their Medicaid programs, stricter
policies that threaten to disturb the very existence of Medicaid may create an even
more detrimental effect on the federal budget—requiring a larger federal remedy
farther down the road. Id.
108
See, Elizabeth Becker & Robert Pear, Trade Pact May Undercut Inexpensive
Drug Imports, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2004 (discussing an international trade
agreement set to be approved by Congress which would narrow the MMA’s
provisions for the importation of drugs by allowing “pharmaceutical companies to
prevent imports of drugs to the United States and also to challenge decisions by
Australia about what drugs should be covered by the country’s health plan, the
prices paid for them and how they can be used”).
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See, e.g., Patches for the Drug Program, supra note 93, § 4, at 14.

